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New Construction of Authentication Codes with
Arbitration from Pseudo-Symplectic Geometry over
Finite Fields
Chen Shang-di Zhao Da-wei
College of Science, Civil Aviation University of China,Tianjin,300300, P.R.China
Abstract. A new construction of authentication codes with arbitration from pseudo-symplectic
geometry over finite fields is given. The parameters and the probabilities of deceptions of the
codes are also computed.
§1 Introduction
To solve the distrust problem of the transmitter and the receiver in the communications
system, Simmons introduced a model of authentication codes with arbitration (see [1]), we
write symply (A2-code) defined as follows:
Let S, ET ,ER and M be four non-empty finite sets, and f : S×ET →M and g : M×ER →
S ∪ {reject} be two maps. The six-tuple (S,ET , ER,M ; f, g) is called an authentication code
with arbitration (A2-code), if
(1) The maps f and g are surjective;
(2) For any m ∈M and eT ∈ ET , if there is an s ∈ S, satisfying f(s, eT ) = m, then such an
s is uniquely determined by the given m and eT ;
(3) p(eT , eR) 6= 0 and f(s, eT ) = m implies g(m, eR) = s, otherwise, g(m, eR) = {reject}.
S, ET ,ER and M are called the set of source states, the set of transmitter’s encoding rules,
the set of receiver’s decoding rules and the set of messages, respectively; f and g are called the
encoding map and decoding map respectively. The cardinals |S|, |ET |,|ER| and |M | are called
the size parameters of the code.
In a authentication system that permits arbitration, this model includes four attendances:
the transmitter, the receiver, the opponent and the arbiter, and includes five attacks:
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21) The opponent’s impersonation attack: the largest probability of an opponent’s successful
impersonation attack is PI . Then
PI = max
m∈M
{
| eR ∈ ER|eR ⊂ m |
| ER |
}
.
2) The opponent’s substitution attack: the largest probability of an opponent’s successful
substitution attack is PS . Then
PS = max
m∈M


max
m 6=m′∈M
| eR ∈ ER|eR ⊂ m and eR ⊂ m
′
|
| eR ∈ ER|eR ⊂ m |

 .
3) The transmitter’s impersonation attack: the largest probability of a transmitter’s suc-
cessful impersonation attack is PT . Then
PT = max
eT∈ET


max
m∈M,eT 6∈m
| {eR ∈ ER|eR ⊂ m and p (eR, eT ) 6= 0} |
| {eR ∈ ER|p(eR, eT ) 6= 0} |

 .
4) The receiver’s impersonation attack: the largest probability of a receiver’s successful
impersonation attack is PR0 . Then
PR0 = max
eR∈ER


max
m∈M
| {eT ∈ ET |eT ⊂ m and p (eR, eT ) 6= 0} |
| {eT ∈ ET |p(eR, eT ) 6= 0} |

 .
5) The receiver’s substitution attack: the largest probability of a receiver’s successful sub-
stitution attack is PR1 .Then
PR1 = max
eR∈ER,m∈M


max
m
′
∈M
| {eT ∈ ET |eT ⊂ m,m
′
and p (eR, eT ) 6= 0} |
| {eT ∈ ET |eT ⊂ mand p(eR, eT ) 6= 0} |

 .
Notes: p (eR, eT ) 6= 0 implies that any information s encoded by eT can be authenticated by
eR.
In this paper, the tP denotes the transpose of a matrix P . Some concepts and notations
refer to [2].
§2 Pseudo-Symplectic Geometry
Let Fq be the finite field with q elements, where q is a power of 2, n = 2ν + δ and δ=1,2.
Let
K =
(
0 I(ν)
I(ν) 0
)
, S1 =
(
K
1
)
, S2 =

 K 0 1
1 1


and Sδ is an (2ν + δ)× (2ν + δ) non-alternate symmetric matrix.
The pseudo-symplectic group of degree (2ν + δ) over Fq is defined to be the set of matrices
Ps2ν+δ(Fq) = {T |TSδ
tT = Sδ} denoted by Ps2ν+δ(Fq).
Let F
(2ν+δ)
q be the (2ν+δ) -dimensional row vector space over Fq. Ps2ν+δ(Fq) has an action
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on F
(2ν+δ)
q defined as follows:
F (2ν+δ)q × Ps2ν+δ(Fq)→ F
(2ν+δ)
q
((x1, x2, . . . , x2ν+δ), T )→ (x1, x2, . . . , x2ν+δ)T
The vector space F
(2ν+δ)
q together with this group action is called the pseudo-symplectic space
over the finite field Fq of characteristic 2.
Let P be an m-dimensional subspace of F
(2ν+δ)
q , then PSδ
tP is cogredient to one of the
following three normal forms
M(m, 2s, s ) =

 0 I
(s)
I(s) 0
0(m−2s)


M(m, 2s+ 1, s ) =


0 I(s)
I(s) 0
1
0(m−2s−1)


M(m, 2s+ 2, s ) =


0 I(s)
I(s) 0
0 1
1 1
0(m−2s−2)


for some s such that 0 ≤ s ≤ [m/2]. We say that P ia a subspace of type (m, 2s+ τ, s, ǫ), where
τ =0,1 or 2 and ǫ =0 or 1, if
(i) PSδ
tP is cogredient to M(m, 2s+ τ, s), and
(ii) e2ν+1 /∈ P or e2ν+1 ∈ P according to ǫ = 0 or ǫ = 1, respectively.
Let P be an m-dimensional subspace of F
(2ν+δ)
q . Denote by P⊥ the set of vectors which are
orthogonal to every vector of P , i.e.,
P⊥ = {y ∈ F (2ν+δ)q |ySδ
tx = 0 for all x ∈ P}
Obviously, P⊥ is a (2ν + δ −m)-dimensional subspace of F
(2ν+δ)
q .
More properties of geometry of pseudo-symplectic groups over finite fields of characteristic
2 can be found in [2].
In [3-5] several constructions of authentication codes with arbitration from the geometry
of classical groups over finite fields were given and studied. In this paper a construction of
authentication codes with arbitration from pseudo-symplectic geometry over finite fields is
given. The parameters and the probabilities of deceptions of the codes are also computed.
§3 Construction
Assume that n = (2ν + δ), s − 1 ≤ s0 ≤ ν, 2s ≤ m0, 2s0 ≤ m0. Let 〈ν0, e2ν+1〉 be a fixed
subspace of type (2,0,0,1) in the (2ν +2)-dimensional pseudo-symplectic space F
(2ν+2)
q ; P0 is a
4fixed subspace of type (m0, 2s0, s0, 1) in F
(2ν+2)
q and 〈ν0, e2ν+1〉 ⊂ P0 ⊂ 〈ν0, e2ν+1〉
⊥. The set
of source states S = {s|s is a subspace of type (2s, 2(s − 1), s − 1, 1) and 〈ν0, e2ν+1〉 ⊂ s ⊂
P0}; the set of transmitter’s encoding rules ET={eT |eT is a subspace of type (4,4,1,1) and
eT ∩ P0 = 〈ν0, e2ν+1〉}; the set of receiver’s decoding rules ER={eR|eR is a subspace of type
(2,2,0,1) in the (2ν + 2)-dimensional pseudo-symplectic space F
(2ν+2)
q }; the set of messages
M = {m|m is a subspace of type (2s+2, 2s+2, s, 1), 〈ν0, e2ν+1〉 ⊂ m, and m∩P0 is a subspace
of type (2s, 2(s− 1), s− 1, 1)}.
Define the encoding map:
f : S × ET →M, (s, eT ) 7−→ m = s+ eT
and the decoding map:
g : M × ER → S ∪ {reject}
(m, eR) 7→
{
s if eR ⊂ m, where s = m ∩ P0.
{reject} if eR 6⊂ m.
Lemma 1. The six-tuple(S,ET , ER,M ; f, g) is an authentication code with arbitration,
that is
(1) s+ eT = m ∈M , for all s ∈ S and eT ∈ ET ;
(2) for any m ∈ M , s = m ∩ P0 is the uniquely source state contained in m and there is
eT ∈ ET , such that m = s+ eT .
Proof. (1) For any s ∈ S, s is a subspace of type (2s, 2(s− 1), s− 1, 1) and 〈ν0, e2ν+1〉 ⊂
S ⊂ P0, we can assume that
s =

 Qν0
e2ν+1

 2s− 21
1
,
then

 Qν0
e2ν+1

S2
t

 Qν0
e2ν+1

 =


0
I(s−1)
0
0
0
0
I(s−1)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0


s− 1 s− 1 1 1
.
For any eT ∈ ET , eT is a subspace of type (4,4,1,1) and eT ∩ P0 = 〈ν0, e2ν+1〉, we can
assume that
eT =


v0
e2ν+1
u1
u2


1
1
1
1
,
then


v0
e2ν+1
u1
u2

S2
t


v0
e2ν+1
u1
u2

 =


0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1


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Obviously, u1, u2 /∈ S. Hence m = s+ eT is a (2s+2)-dimensional subspace and m∩P0 = s
is a subspace of type (2s, 2(s− 1), s− 1, 1). We also have
mS2
tm =


Q
v0
e2ν+1
u1
u2


S2
t


Q
v0
e2ν+1
u1
u2


=


0 I(s−1) 0 0 ∗ ∗
I(s−1) 0 0 0 ∗ ∗
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
∗ ∗ 0 0 0 1
∗ ∗ 0 0 1 1


.
Therefore, m is a subspace of type (2s+2, 2s+2, s, 1), 〈ν0, e2ν+1〉 ⊂ m, and m∩P0 is a subspace
of type (2s, 2(s− 1), s− 1, 1), i.e., m ∈M is a message.
(2) If m ∈ M , let s = m ∩ P0, then s is a subspace of type (2s, 2(s − 1), s − 1, 1) and
〈ν0, e2ν+1〉 ⊂ S ⊂ P0, i.e., s ∈ S is a source state. Now let
s =

 Qv0
e2ν+1

 2s−21
1
, ˙ then sS2
ts =


0 I(s−1) 0 0
I(s−1) 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0


s−1
s−1
1
1
.
Since m 6= P0, therefore, there are u1, u2 ∈ m \ P0 such that m = s⊕ 〈u1, u2〉 and

Q
v0
e2ν+1
u1
u2


S2
t


Q
v0
e2ν+1
u1
u2


=


0 I(s−1) 0 0 ∗ ∗
I(s−1) 0 0 0 ∗ ∗
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
∗ ∗ 0 0 0 1
∗ ∗ 0 0 1 1


(∗)
Let eT = 〈v0, e2ν+1, u1, u2〉. Form (∗) we deduce that eT is a subspace of type (4,4,1,1) and
eT ∩P0 = 〈ν0, e2ν+1〉. Therefore eT is a encoding rule of transmitter and satisfying s+ eT = m.
If s′ is another source state contained in m, then s′ ⊂ m,P0, i.e., s
′ ⊂ m ∩ P0 = s. While
dims′=dims, so s′=s, i.e., s is the uniquely source state contained in m.
Assuming the transmitter’s encoding rules and the receiver’s decoding rules are chosen
according to a uniform probability distribution, we can assume that 〈v0, e2ν+1〉 = 〈e1, e2ν+1〉,
then 〈v0, e2ν+1〉
⊥ = 〈e1, e2, · · · , eν , eν+2, · · · e2ν , e2ν+1〉.
Let n1 denote the number of subspaces of type (2s, 2(s−1), s−1, 1) contained in 〈ν0, e2ν+1〉
⊥,
and containing 〈ν0, e2ν+1〉; n2, the number of subspaces of type (m0, 2s0, s0, 1) contained in
〈ν0, e2ν+1〉
⊥, and containing a fixed subspace of type (2s, 2(s − 1), s − 1, 1) as above; and
n3, the number of subspaces of type (m0, 2s0, s0, 1) contained in 〈ν0, e2ν+1〉
⊥, and containing
〈ν0, e2ν+1〉.
Lemma 2. (1) n1 = N(2s− 2, s− 1; 2ν − 2);
(2) n2 = N(m0 − 2s, s0 − s+ 1; 2(ν − s));
(3) n3 = N(m0 − 2, s0; 2ν − 2).
Where N(m, s;n) is the number of subspaces of type (m, s) in the n-dimensional symplectic
space F
(n)
q .
6Proof. (1) We can assume that s is a subspace of type (2s, 2(s − 1), s − 1, 1) and
〈ν0, e2ν+1〉 ⊂ s ⊂ 〈ν0, e2ν+1〉
⊥. Clearly, s has a form as follows
s =

 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 P2 P3 0 P5 P6 0 0

 11
2s−2
1 s−1 ν−s 1 s−1 ν−s 1 1
,
where (P2, P3, P5, P6) is a subspace of type (2s − 2, s − 1) in the symplectic space F
(2ν−2)
q .
Therefore, n1 = N(2s− 2, s− 1; 2ν − 2).
(2) Assume that P is a subspace of type (m0, 2s0, s0, 1) containing a fixed subspace of type
(2s, 2(s− 1), s− 1, 1) as above and P ⊂ 〈ν0, e2ν+1〉
⊥. It is easy to know that P has a form as
follows
P =


1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 I(s−1) 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 I(s−1) 0 0 0
0 0 L3 0 0 L6 0 0


1
1
s−1
s−1
m0−2s
1 s−1 ν−s 1 s−1 ν−s 1 1
,
where (L3, L6) is a subspace of type (m0 − 2s, s0 − s + 1) in the symplectic space F
2(ν−s)
q .
Therefore, n2 = N(m0 − 2s, s0 − s+ 1; 2(ν − s)).
(3) Similar to the proof of (1), we have n3 = N(m0 − 2, s0; 2ν − 2).
Lemma 3. The number of the source states is |S| = N(2s−2, s−1; 2ν−2)N(m0−2s, s0−
s+ 1; 2(ν − s))/N(m0 − 2, s0; 2ν − 2).
Proof. |S| is the number of subspace of type (2s, 2(s − 1), s − 1, 1) contained in P0, and
containing 〈ν0, e2ν+1〉. In order to compute |S|, we define a (0,1)-matrix, whose rows are
indexed by the subspaces of type (2s, 2(s − 1), s − 1, 1) containing 〈ν0, e2ν+1〉 and contained
in 〈ν0, e2ν+1〉
⊥ whose columns are indexed by the subspaces of type (m0, 2s0, s0, 1) containing
〈ν0, e2ν+1〉 and contained in 〈ν0, e2ν+1〉
⊥, and with a 1 or 0 in the (i,j) position of the matrix,
if the i-th subspace of type (2s, 2(s− 1), s− 1, 1) is or is not contained in the j-th subspace of
type (m0, 2s0, s0, 1), respectively. If we count the number of 1’s in the matrix by rows, we get
n1 · n2, where n1 is the number of rows and n2 is the number of 1’s in each row. If we count
the number of 1’s in the matrix by columns, we get n3 · |S|, where n3 is the number of columns
and |S| is the number of 1’s in each column. Thus we have n1 · n2 = n3 · |S|.
Lemma 4. The number of the encoding rules of transmitter is |ET | = q
4(ν−1).
Proof. Since eT is a subspace of type (4,4,1,1) and eT ∩P0 = 〈ν0, e2ν+1〉, the transmitter’s
encoding rules have the form as follows
eT =


1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 R2 R3 1 R5 R6 0 0
0 L2 L3 0 L5 L6 0 1


1
1
1
1
1 s−1 ν−s 1 s−1 ν−s 1 1
,
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where R2, R3, R5, R6, L2, L3, L5, L6 arbitrarily. Therefore, |ET | = q
4(ν−1).
Lemma 5. The number of the decoding rules of receiver is |ER| = q
2ν .
Proof. Since eR is a subspace of type (2,2,0,1) in the (2ν + 2)-dimensional pseudo-
symplectic space F
(2ν+2)
q , it has the form as follows
eR =
(
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 0 1
)
1
1
1 s−1 ν−s 1 s−1 ν−s 1 1
,
where R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6 arbitrarily. Therefore, |ER| = q
2ν .
Lemma 6. For any m ∈ M , let the number of eT and eR contained in m be a and b,
respectively. Then a = q4(s−1), b = q2s.
Proof. Let m be a message. From the definition of m, we may take m as follows:
m =


1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 I(s−1) 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 I(s−1) 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1


1 s−1 ν−s 1 s−1 ν−s 1 1
,
If eT ⊂ m, then we can assume
eT =


1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 R2 0 1 R5 0 0 0
0 L2 0 0 L5 0 0 1


1
1
1
1
1 s−1 ν−s 1 s−1 ν−s 1 1
,
where R2, R5, L2, L5 arbitrarily. Therefore, a = q
4(s−1).
If eR ⊂ m, then we can assume
eR =
(
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
R1 R2 0 R4 R5 0 0 1
)
1
1
1 s−1 ν−s 1 s−1 ν−s 1 1
,
where R1, R2, R4, R5 arbitrarily. Therefore, b = q
2s.
Lemma 7. The number of the messages is |M | = q4(ν−s)|S|.
Proof. We know that a message contains a source state and the number of the transmitter’s
encoding rules contained in a message is a. Therefore we have |M | = |S||ET |/a = q
4(ν−s)|S|.
Lemma 8. (1) For any eT ∈ ET , the number of eR which is incidence with eT is c = q
2.
(2) For any eR ∈ ER, the number of eT which is incidence with eR is d = q
2(ν−1).
Proof. (1) Assume that eT ∈ ET , eT is a subspace of type (4,4,1,1) and eT∩P0 = 〈ν0, e2ν+1〉,
8we may take eT as follows:
eT =


1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1


1
1
1
1
1 s−1 ν−s 1 s−1 ν−s 1 1
.
If eR ⊂ eT , then we can assume
eR =
(
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
R1 0 0 R4 0 0 0 1
)
1
1
1 s−1 ν−s 1 s−1 ν−s 1 1
,
where R1, R4, arbitrarily. Therefore, c = q
2.
(2) Assume that eR ⊂ ER, eR is a subspace of type (2,2,0,1) in the (2ν + 2)-dimensional
pseudo-symplectic space F
(2ν+2)
q , we may take eR as follows:
eR =
(
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
)
1
1
1 s−1 ν−s 1 s−1 ν−s 1 1
.
If eT ⊃ eR, then we can assume
eT =


1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 R2 R3 1 R5 R6 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1


1
1
1
1
1 s−1 ν−s 1 s−1 ν−s 1 1
,
where R2, R3, R5, R6 arbitrarily. Therefore, d = q
2(ν−1).
Lemma 9. For any m ∈M and eR ⊂ m, the number of eT contained in m and containing
eR is q
2(s−1) .
Proof. The matrix of m is like lemma 6, then for any eR ⊂ m, assume that
eR =
(
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
R1 R2 0 R4 R5 0 0 1
)
1
1
1 s−1 ν−s 1 s−1 ν−s 1 1
,
if eT ⊂ m and eT ⊃ eR, then eT has a form as follows
eT =


1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 L2 0 1 L5 0 0 0
0 R2 0 0 R5 0 0 1


1
1
1
1
1 s−1 ν−s 1 s−1 ν−s 1 1
,
where L2, L5 arbitrarily. Therefore, the number of eT contained in m and containing eR is
q2(s−1).
Lemma 10. Assume that m1 and m2 are two distinct messages which commonly contain
a transmitter’s encoding rule e′T . s1 and s2 contained in m1 and m2 are two source states,
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respectively. Assume that s0 = s1 ∩ s2, dim s0 = k, then 2 ≤ k ≤ 2s− 1, and
(1) The number of eR contained in m1 ∩m2 is q
k;
(2) For any eR ⊂ m1 ∩m2, the number of eT contained in m1 ∩m2 and containing eR is
qk−2.
Proof. Since m1 = s1 + e
′
T ,m2 = s2 + e
′
T and m1 6= m2, then s1 6= s2. And because of
〈ν0, e2ν+1〉 ⊂ s1, s2, therefore, 2 ≤ k ≤ 2s− 1.
(1) Assume that s′i is the complementary subspace of s0 in the si, then si = s0 + s
′
i (i =
1, 2). From mi = si + e
′
T = s0 + s
′
i + e
′
T and si = mi ∩ P0 (i = 1, 2) , we have s0 =
(m1 ∩ P0)
⋂
(m2 ∩ P0) = m1 ∩m2 ∩ P0 = s1 ∩m2 = s2 ∩m1 and m1 ∩m2 = (s1 + e
′
T ) ∩m2 =
(s0+s
′
1+e
′
T )∩m2 = ((s0+e
′
T )+s
′
1)∩m2 . Because s0+e
′
T ⊂ m2 ,m1∩m2 = (s0+e
′
T )+(s
′
1∩m2) .
While s
′
1 ∩m2 ⊆ s1 ∩m2 = s0 , m1 ∩m2 = s0 + e
′
T . Therefore dim (m1 ∩m2) = k + 2. From
the definition of the message, we may take m1 and m2 as follows respectively
m1 =


1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 A2 0 0 A5 0 0 0
0 A′2 0 0 A
′
5 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1


1
1
s−1
s−1
1
1
1 s−1 ν−s 1 s−1 ν−s 1 1
,
m2 =


1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 B2 0 0 B5 0 0 0
0 B′2 0 0 B
′
5 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1


1
1
s−1
s−1
1
1
1 s−1 ν−s 1 s−1 ν−s 1 1
.
Thus
m1 ∩m2 =


1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 P2 0 0 P5 0 0 0
0 P ′2 0 0 P
′
5 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1


1
1
s−1
s−1
1
1
1 s−1 ν−s 1 s−1 ν−s 1 1
.
and
dim
(
0 P2 0 0 P5 0 0 0
0 P ′2 0 0 P
′
5 0 0 0
)
= k − 2.
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If for any eR ⊂ m1 ∩m2, then
eR =
(
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
R1 R2 0 R4 R5 0 0 1
)
1
1
1 s−1 ν−s 1 s−1 ν−s 1 1
,
where R1, R4 arbitrarily, and every row of (0 R2 0 0 R5 0 0 0) is the linear combination of the
base of (
0 P2 0 0 P5 0 0 0
0 P ′2 0 0 P
′
5 0 0 0
)
.
So it is easy to know that the number of eR contained in m1 ∩m2 is q
k.
(2) Assume that m1 ∩m2 has the form of (1), then for any eR ⊂ m1 ∩m2, we can assume
that
eR =
(
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
R1 R2 0 R4 R5 0 0 1
)
1
1
1 s−1 ν−s 1 s−1 ν−s 1 1
,
If eT ⊂ m1 ∩m2 and eR ⊂ eT , then eT has the form as follows
eT =


1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 L2 0 1 L5 0 0 0
0 R2 0 0 R5 0 0 1


1
1
1
1
1 s−1 ν−s 1 s−1 ν−s 1 1
,
where every row of (0 L2 0 0 L5 0 0 0) is the linear combination of the base of(
0 P2 0 0 P5 0 0 0
0 P ′2 0 0 P
′
5 0 0 0
)
,
then the number of eT contained in m1 ∩m2 and containing eR is q
k−2.
Theorem 1. The parameters of constructed authentication codes with arbitration are
|S| = N(2s− 2, s− 1; 2ν − 2)N(m0 − 2s, s0 − s+ 1; 2(ν − s))/N(m0 − 2, s0; 2ν − 2);
|M | = q4(ν−s)|S|; |ET | = q
4(ν−1); |ER| = q
2ν .
Theorem 2. In the A2 authentication codes, if the transmitter’s encoding rules and the
receiver’s decoding rules are chosen according to a uniform probability distribution, the largest
probabilities of success for different types of deceptions:
PI =
1
q2(ν−s)
; PS =
1
q
; PT =
1
q
; PR0 =
1
q2(ν−s)
; PR1 =
1
q
;
Proof. (1) The number of the transmitter’s encoding rules contained in a message is b,
then
PI = max
m∈M
{
| eR ∈ ER|eR ⊂ m |
| ER |
}
=
b
| ER |
=
1
q2(ν−s)
.
(2) Assume that opponent get m1 which is from transmitter, and send m2 instead of m1,
when s1 contained in m1 is different from s1 contained in m2, the opponent’s substitution
attack can success. Because eR ⊂ eT ⊂ m1, thus the opponent select e
′
T ⊂ m1 , satisfying
CHEN Shang-di, et al. 11
m2 = s2 + e
′
T and dim(s1
⋂
s2) = k, then
PS = max
m∈M


max
m 6=m′∈M
| eR ∈ ER|eR ⊂ m and eR ⊂ m
′
|
| eR ∈ ER|eR ⊂ m |

 =
qk
b
where k = 2s− 1, Ps =
1
q
is the largest.
(3) Let eT be the transmitter’s secret encoding rules, s be a source state, and m1 be the
message corresponding to the source state s encoded by eT . Then the number of the receiver’s
decoding rules contained in m1 is eR. Assume that m2 is a distinct message corresponding to s,
but m2 cannot be encoded by eT . Then m1 ∩m2 contains q receiver’s decoding rules at most.
Therefore the probability of transmitter’s successful impersonation attack is
PT = max
eT∈ET


max
m∈M,eT 6⊂m
| {eR ∈ ER|eR ⊂ m ∩ eT } |
| {eR ∈ ER|eR ⊂ eT } |

 = qq2 = 1q
.
(4) Let eR be the receiver’s decoding rule, we have known that the number of transmitter’s
encoding rules containing eR is q
2(ν−s) and a message containing eR has q
2(s−1) transmitter’s
encoding rules. Hence the probability of a receiver’s successful impersonation attack is
PR0 = max
eR∈ER


max
m∈M
| {eT ∈ ET |eT ⊂ m and eR ⊂ eT |
| {eT ∈ ET |eR ⊂ eT |

 = q
2(s−1)
q2(ν−1)
=
1
q2(ν−s)
.
(5) Assume that the receiver declares to receive a message m2 instead of m1, when s2
contained in m1 is different from s2 contained in m2, the receiver’s substitution attack can be
successful. Since eR ⊂ eT ⊂ m1, receiver is superior to select e
′
T , satisfying eR ⊂ e
′
T ⊂ m1 ,
thus m2 = s2 + e
′
T , and dim(s1 ∩ s2) = k as large as possible. Therefore, the probability of a
receiver’s successful substitution attack is
PR1 = max
eR∈ER,m∈M


max
m
′
∈M
| {eT ∈ ET |eT ⊂ m,m
′
and eR ⊂ eT } |
| {eT ∈ ET |eR ⊂ eT } |

 =
qk−2
q2(s−1)
,
where k = 2s− 1, PR1 =
1
q
is the largest.
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